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ABSTRACT 
Evidence Based Practice is one of the most prevalent concepts in social work today, 
guiding social workers across the world.  This theoretical thesis examines Evidence Based 
Practice, its theoretic foundations, and its application in social work, using the theories of 
Logical Positivism and Critical Rationalism from Philosophy of Science.  Philosophy of Science 
is a branch in Philosophy that studies and theorizes about precisely what science is, how science 
works, the implications of science, and the logic behind it.  This thesis argues that Logical 
Positivism is the scientific foundation that Evidence Based Practice rests on, and uses Critical 
rationalism to dispute Evidence Based Practice’s theoretic foundation. The conclusions were that 
we should be concerned about EBP affecting the future development of therapy, that it creates 
the possibility of harm when used in policymaking, that we should not be favoring one theory 
over another just because one has more supporting research, and the idea that theories can be 
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Philosophy of Science and Evidence Based Practice in Clinical Social Work 
An important drive, in the field of clinical social work, has been the repeated attempts to 
reinforce social work’s scientific merit and practice.  This has led to the concept of Evidence 
Based Practice (EBP), which has become the new ‘cause célèbre’ in both the broader field of 
Social Work, and in Medicine.  In addition, government and private insurance have also been 
supporting the implementation of EBP for both mental and physical health services.  However, 
support for EBP has not been universal; there have been a number of academics and practitioners 
that have objected to EBP’s theory and its implementation in the literature, for a wide variety of 
reasons that I will explore further on. 
The most commonly accepted definition for Evidence Based Practice, is that it is “the 
integration of the best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values” (Sackett, 
Straus, Richardson, Rosenberg, & Haynes, 2000). Originally, the definition of EBP did not 
include clinical expertise, nor patient values, each were added at different points, from its 
introduction in 1992, mostly because of criticism from practitioners and advocates for client 
rights.  For example the definition given in 1996 was “Evidence based medicine is the 
conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the 
care of individual patients.  The practice of evidence based medicine means integrating 
individual clinical expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic 




as Evidence Based Medicine (EBM), before being rebranded to Evidence Based Practice, as it 
spread to other fields.  EBP and EBM are the same thing. 
Since its introduction, EBP has spread across the world, and is influencing the practice 
and policy of a wide range of professions, including medicine, teaching, social work, 
psychology, dentistry, and more.  While there is a lot of support for EBP in the literature, that 
support has been far from universal, as there have been a number of criticisms raised about how 
it is being used in practice and in policy.  EBP has been criticized using different philosophies of 
science, using various social theories, and various other philosophic theories including 
postmodernism and feminist theory (Goldenberg, 2005).  A common accusation is that EBP’s 
theoretical foundation uses an impoverished view of science, EBP’s links to positivism, 
empiricism, and logical positivism (which grew out of positivism and empiricism).  It has also 
been argued that EBP is not at all the Kuhnian paradigm shift it claims to be.  One significant 
argument I did not see was Karl Popper’s (year) Critical Rationalism, which in a way was odd, 
as he was one of the first philosopher’s to thoroughly refute Logical Positivism, and many 
different articles had already made the connection as well.  However, in another way it is not too 
surprising, in that Karl Popper and his theories are virtually unheard of in North America, and 
not all that well known in the West in general.  On top of that, Popper has often been erroneously 
attached to the Logical Positivist movement, and his theories were thrown in as well. 
EBP has had a significant impact on virtually every aspect of social work. It affects 
teaching, practice, and policy.  BSW and MSW students are taught EBP.  Therapists are 
expected to use Evidence Based treatments such as CBT in their treatment planning and 




EBP, from the little clinic, to the federal government. EBP is a pretty big deal in social work and 
has an effect on virtually every social worker. 
Theories 
 The first theory I have chosen to examine in my investigation of Evidence Based 
Practice, is Logical Positivism (LP) from Philosophy of Science.  I have chosen this theory 
because of the repeated links made in several different articles, both for and against EBP 
(Anastas, 2014; Goldenberg, 2005; Gray & Mcdonald, 2006; Greenhalgh and Russel, 2009; 
Houston, 2005; Okpych & Yu 2014; Thyer, 2008; White & Willis, 2002).  I chose Logical 
Positivism specifically, because it was the last of the line in both the Positivist movement, and 
the British Empiricist movement (Logical Positivism is also known as Logical Empiricism). The 
creators of LP had chosen at the start to include Positivism and British Empiricism (Ayer, 1952, 
p. 2, 91).  EBP itself connects in similar ways to all three of these theories, and LP is the best 
choice, because it incorporates the other two theories. 
 As a counterpoint, I have chosen Karl Popper’s (year) Critical Rationalism (CR).  I am 
choosing CR for two reasons.  First, it was one of the key theories that overturned Logical 
Positivism, and second, I could not find any mention of Popper in the literature surrounding 
EBP. 
 In the next chapter, I will outline my conceptualization for this thesis, and I will explain 
my methodology.  I will unpack Evidence Based Practice, Present Logical Positivism and link 
EBP with Logical Positivism, Present Critical Rationalism as a counter to LP, and lastly use CR 






Conceptualization and Methodology 
This thesis will examine the theory behind Evidence Based Practice and its 
implementation, followed by how EBP theory connects to Philosophy of Science, by using the 
theories of Logical Positivism and Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalism.  I will explore how 
Evidence Based Practice is based in Logical Positivism, why the theories of Logical Positivism 
have problems using the theories of Critical Rationalism, and then shift those arguments back on 
to Evidence Based Practice. 
Philosophy of Science attempts to understand all the aspects of precisely how science 
works, and what exactly science is.  Most importantly, Philosophy of Science can help us 
understand the flaws and weaknesses that exist within science, such as examining the ways we 
are inherently biased, or helping us understand some of the subtler differences between science 
and pseudoscience. 
Logical positivism.  
I chose the theory of Logical Positivism because Evidence Based Practice’s concepts of 
science are deeply rooted in the Positivist movement of the 16th century, British Empiricism of 
the 17th century, both which Logical Positivism inherit as its foundation.  EBP also has 
connections to the new theories Logical Positivism was adding.  Logical Positivism functionally 
was the last phase of both the Positivist movement and British Empiricism.  LP started in the late 
1800s and lasted in Philosophy until about 1960.  By then it was widely considered a dead end 
by most philosophers of science, leading to the statement in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy that 
“Logical positivism, then, is dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes” 




Critical rationalism  
One of the major critiques that offered strong refutation to many of Logical Positivism’s 
key arguments was Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalism.  Popper’s seminal books in Philosophy of 
Science were: The Logic of Scientific Discovery, which was published as Logik der Forschung in 
Austria, 1935, and was translated into English by Popper himself in 1960 and further annotated 
by him in 1968; Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge was 
published in 1965 in English.  These two books form the core concepts behind Critical 
Rationalism.  As Critical Rationalism was one of the principle schools of thought that overturned 
Logical Positivism, and due to EPB’s close connection to Logical Positivism, Critical 
Rationalism suggests itself as a good tool for examining some of the potential failings in EBP. 
Methodology 
The main avenue of investigation regarding EPB, in this thesis will be its focus on using 
scientific research (evidence) in clinical practice.  EBP’s founders in their original article had 
made the bold claim that EBP (specifically its emphasis on using evidence in practice) was a 
Kuhnian paradigm shift (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 1992, p. 2420-2421).  A 
paradigm shift is an event that revolutionizes that specific branch of science (e.g. Einstein’s 
theory of relativity radically shifted Physics), because it completely changes the way scientists 
think about that branch of science and generally falsifies all of its prior theories or forces their 
reformulation.  EBP’s claim of creating such a shift is completely absurd, as EBP did not 
fundamentally revolutionize the way scientists (or doctors) think about medicine, not even a 
little, as White & Willis point out (2002, p.8) it is not even a new concept. 
This thesis will examine in detail the finer points of the concepts of evidence as it applies 




actual practice the concepts of EBP are used, by individuals, by agencies, by insurance 
companies, and by government.  In addition, we will also examine what constitutes evidence in 
social work, and the inherent problems with this type of evidence. 
The first part (Chapter 3) will examine Evidence Based Practice.  I will offer an overview 
of its history, examine its concepts, and detail some of the literature that supports it, and some of 
the literature that assails it.  Following that, I will move to Logical Positivism (Chapter 4).  I will 
outline Logical Positivism’s lengthy history and authors, and I will give a brief overview of its 
theories that are most relevant, and the theories it bases itself off of (Positivism & Empiricism), 
after which I will connect the relevant theories from Logical Positivism and its antecedents, to 
Evidence Based Practice.  Next (Chapter 5), I will introduce Karl Popper and Critical 
Rationalism. I will look at his history, and I will introduce his relevant opposing theories.  
Finally in the Discussion (Chapter 6), I will bring all the above material together and analyze it, 
and examine how that analysis impacts Evidence Based Practice, by discussing the flaws I 
believe I will find, both within its theory, and in its application in the world at large, due to its 
chosen theoretical foundation.  I am anticipating that Popper’s Critical Rationalism will be quite 
fruitful, because of how strongly it refuted Logical Positivism as a whole.  Primarily I expect to 
be using his concepts of falsification, objective knowledge, his criterion for demarcation between 
science, and non-science, his concepts of the utility of evidence, and more.  My intent is to 
evaluate the results by using overall discussion. 
Biases 
Obviously since my objective is to offer criticism toward Evidence Based Practice, I have 
some bias against it.  Part of this stems from my sense that it is pushing therapists into using 




anything else.  I worry that it will stunt the future development of new therapies, and I worry it is 
taking away a lot of choice from clients as to the kind of therapy they would prefer.  I guess 
fundamentally my problem is that I see Social Work, as both a science and as an art, and I think 
EBP is sacrificing the art part.  There is so much we do not understand about the mind, the brain, 
and everything human.  In my humble opinion, I think that the artistic/creative aspect of social 
work is important too, for creatively building client relationships, figuring out what is going 
wrong for that client. 
Conversely, I largely agree with EBP’s basic concept.  Of course using available research 
to help determine treatment is a good idea.  I doubt there would be many who would disagree 
with that.  It is the theories that EBP bases itself upon that is of concern. 
As another bias, I am quite fond of Poppers theories in Philosophy of Science; it is partly 
why I chose him, because I think many of his theories contain good ways to improve science.  As 
the Nobel Prize winning neurophysiologist, Sir John Carew Eccles,  wrote in his book Facing 
Reality (1970), Popper’s theories can be very freeing for scientists, because of how it shifts the 
objective of science away from proof to disproof “because it is not scientifically disgraceful to 
have one’s hypothesis falsified” (p. 105).  A sentiment that I share in.  Being relatively familiar 
with Positivism and Logical Positivism, I think Popper pretty thoroughly demolished them 
through superior logic. 
Strengths and Limitations 
The key limitation of this thesis is that it is entirely theoretically based, as all the work 
and the analysis will be done using two different theories from philosophies of science, to target 
the theory behind EBP.  However, as I will come to argue, everything involving human 




theories.  My thesis’s strength is that the theory I am using (Critical Rationalism), is the key 
theory that overthrew Logical Positivism, which is the theory that I am arguing Evidence Based 
Practice used as its foundation, consciously or not by its authors. 
In the next chapter, I will examine Evidence Based Practice.  I will examine its history, 
its concepts, and I will delve into some of the available literature, both literature in its favor, and 







Phenomenon: Evidence Based Practice 
Evidence Based Practice is an evolved version of Evidence Based Medicine (EBM).  
Introduced by the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group, comprised of Guyatt et al. (1992), 
thought that EBM represented a paradigm shift in medicine, in that it would complete transform 
the conceptualization and practice of medicine.   
Based on an awareness of the limitations of traditional determinants of clinical decisions, 
a new paradigm for medical practice has arisen.  Evidence-based medicine deals directly with the 
uncertainties of clinical medicine and has the potential for transforming the education and 
practice of the next generation of physicians.  (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 1992, 
p. 2424) 
The basic concept that they presented for EBM was that, 1) clinical experience and the 
development of clinical instincts are necessary for the development of competence, 2) that the 
study and understanding of the basic mechanisms of disease are necessary but also insufficient 
on their own for clinical competence, 3) and that a comprehensive understanding of the concepts 
of evidence are necessary to be able to correctly interpret available research literature.  These 
were the three original tenets of Evidence Based Medicine.  As time went on, the main tenants of 
EBM shifted to “integrating individual clinical expertise and the best external evidence” 
(Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes, & Richardson, 1996).  A few years later, the concept of 
patient values was added as well (Sacket et al., 2000).  During this period, the core ideas behind 
EBM traveled into other fields, including the fields of nursing, dentistry, education, psychology, 
and social work.  Because of the propagation of its concepts into other non-medical fields, EBM 




Since its introduction, EBP has slowly spread to most corners of social work, including 
the various payment-for-service mechanisms such as private and public insurance.  Its tenets are 
guiding policy and practice for both large and small organizations, at all levels of care, including 
inpatient, residential, partial-hospitalization, outpatient, and private practice.  In the United 
States, it has become difficult to receive non-evidence based treatment, unless the client is 
willing to pay for services out of their own pocket, because payment sources are now insisting on 
therapists using specific forms of Evidence Based Treatment.  In the countries where EBP has 
been widely adopted, EBP affects the entire population of people receiving mental health 
services.  Arguably, EBP has been widely adopted in North America and Europe, though it is 
difficult to give a precise account of exactly how far spread it is, as I could not find any sources 
tracking its spread.  There is an extensive paper trail in many of these countries coming from 
government organizations, local services, proponents and opponents of EBP publishing material 
on the subject, and the like, that suggest EBP has been widely adopted, but unfortunately I could 
not find hard data on its dispersal. 
As previously mentioned, the core concept of EBP is the combining of best research 
evidence available for choosing treatment modality, the use of the therapist’s own experience in 
guiding the selection of treatment and the treatment process, and including the values and desires 
of the client in the selection and process of treatment  (Sacket et al., 2000).  The basic scenario is 
that the client comes in to therapy, and together with the client, the therapist attempts to diagnose 
the client, based on the therapist’s experience and by consulting the current scientific literature.  
Next the therapist and the client agree on the treatment, with the therapist again consulting the 




Since the introduction of EBM/EBP, a great deal of literature on the subject has been 
written.  While there have been a large number of articles in favor of EBP, there also have been 
many articles that are critical of it as well, to varying degrees. Some authors felt that EBP was 
baseless or invalid, while others felt it needed more structural adjustments as to which aspect 
should take greater priority, such as placing more emphasis on client driven treatment planning, 
or more emphasis on the therapist’s experience and knowledge.  Others argued that there were 
issues with the nature of evidence, or that certain types of evidence are favored while other types 
are ignored or even discarded.  Most of the favorable articles focused on implementation or 
organizational policy, or they have been trying to either prove the value of EBP, and/or defend 
against arguments that oppose it. Here are some brief examples of articles that are in favor of 
EBP. 
Articles In Support of Evidence Based Practice 
Haynes’s brief editorial (2002) seems directed at making medical doctors, both aware of 
EBP, and to point out how the original focus of EBM on evidence has shifted in EBP to include 
not only the doctor’s experience, but also giving the patient choices, in addition to using 
evidence.  For example Haynes writes that “The term evidence based medicine was developed to 
encourage practitioners and patients to pay due respect—no more, no less—to current best 
evidence in making decisions” (p. 1350) in his argument about how Doctors should use EBP.  
While the article goes into some of the aspects of practitioner experience, and making choices 
available to the client, the emphasis was more on the evidence aspect. 
Thyer (2004) in his article is very optimistic about the wonders of EBP.  The start of his 
conclusion reads, “We are fortunate in that a growing number of brief treatments and 




group research designs and are providing evidence of their effectiveness.” (p. 175), and then 
Thyer proceeded to write about all the short term treatments available to treat this wide range of 
mental illnesses.  Thyer also covered policy implications, including non-clinical applications, 
such as community practice and managerial practice.  The author closes off their article with 
“EBP presents considerable challenges and opportunities, not only to those of us in the academy 
who are charged with developing and maintaining state-of-the-science and state-of-the-art 
clinical-training programs, but also to those providing clinical supervision to practitioners of 
brief treatments and to those who are healthcare providers themselves.” (p. 176).  The bulk of his 
nine page article, however was spent describing the five steps that Thyer feels one must complete 
in order to successfully make use EBP, written in  fine detail. 
In the report from The Presidential Task Force on Evidence Based Practice American 
Psychological Association (Levant et al., 2005), the authors start off by claiming that 
“psychologists have been deeply and uniquely associated with an evidence-based approach to 
patient care.”  (p. 1).  Levant et al. then go on to claim that they were always at the forefront for 
developing EBP a good 50 years before anyone else.  They go describe how their EBP is 
consistent with EBM, and continue to talk further about EBP’s history (which is odd as they 
claim that their EBP goes back 30+ years), and how best to implement EBP in Psychology.    
The rest of the article goes into detail about what EBP is, how to use EBP, and how EBP will 
affect policy, including writing about future directions for each aspect of EBP (Evidence, 
Psychologist, & Client). 
Next, we have Thyer (2008) again looking at EBP, with his main assertion being that we 
(social workers) are all positivists in nature.  The crux of his argument is that turning social work 




our art into a science, “For over 100 years, from the beginnings of the social work profession, we 
have adopted a positivistic and scientific orientation to the discovery of knowledge relevant to 
social work practice.” (p. 344).  The bulk of the article consists of the Thyer’s discussion of the 
past and present of social work and its positivistic attitude, in order to persuade other readers to 
adopt EBP. 
For a change of pace, Gitterman and Knight (2013), revised the term Evidence Based 
Practice into Evidence Guided Practice.  As they put it, “Social workers are encouraged not only 
to engage in theoretically informed and evidence-based practice but also to maintain their 
creativity, authenticity, and flexibility.” (p. 70).  This statement neatly encompasses the authors 
take on the subject, in that while they believe in the utility of evidence, they feel it should not be 
the dominant factor, but simply a part of the clinician’s consideration.  Gitterman and Knight’s 
argument is quite detailed, going into different research results, and stressing the need for better 
and much broader levels of research into the more subtle, hard-to-measure variables. 
Grady and Drisko (2014) chose instead to look at applying EBP to the assessment 
process, rather than the standard approach of EBP of applying it to the treatment decision 
making.  Their principle argument is that “Without the skills, knowledge, and supports needed to 
conduct a thorough and accurate assessment, the EBP process and any proposed plan for 
intervention will fall short of the potential beneficial impact it could have with the client(s) 
seeking assistance.” (p. 6).  Drisko and Grady then go on to write about what is and is not EBP, 
and spend the majority of the rest of the paper looking at how EBP can be applied to client 
assessment.  Drisko and Grady conclude that the “important role of assessment in this process 




suggest further research into developing an EBP system for assessment, along with greater focus 
in assessment training at schools for social work. 
Articles Critical of Evidence Based Practice 
Having sampled the side that supports EBP, I will now look at some of the criticisms of 
EBP.  Webb was one of the earlier critics of EBP, and in this paper, Webb examines the validity 
of EBP in social work.  After finishing an in-depth review of EBP’s history, Webb (2008) starts 
with a critique of the scientific basis of evidence-based practice,  
Evidence-based practice proposes a particular version of rational inference on the part of 
the decision makers.  It assumes that there exist reliable criteria of inferential evidence 
based on objectively veridical or optimal modes of information processing.  In other 
words it creates picture of social workers engaging in an epistemic process of sorting and 
prioritizing information and using this to optimize practice to its best effect” (p. 63).   
Webb then continues to expound on the issues of this rational inference, and goes on to critique 
the ideological basis of evidence-based practice.  The author then concludes that “social work 
should abandon mechanistic approaches, such as evidential practice and those characteristic of 
experimental and behavioral research and replace it with a conceptual model that is designed 
explicitly to recognize social agency as meaningful, intentional, and interconnected” (p. 76). 
White and Willis (2002), on the other hand, posit that EBM is positivism resurgent, 
arguing: “(1) that EBM is based on an impoverished account of scientific knowledge; (2) that 
this is reflected in its behaviorist and positivistic account of disease; and (3) that while it claims 
to grow out of epidemiology it neglects the lessons of the tradition of social epidemiology which 
have always posed a challenge to biomedicine” (p. 6).  White and Willis go on to outline in detail 




science, and how EBM does not represent a paradigmatic shift that the authors of Evidence 
Based Medicine (1992) had claimed it was.  White and Willis conclude that EBM is a regressive 
step, because it undermines and negates the research carried out by public health 
epidemiologists, sociologists of health, and philosophers of medicine.  Adding that the paper 
Evidence Based Medicine (1992) “has revealed the limited, highly scientific and positivistic 
characteristics of EBM, and shown how they limit and constrain our knowledge of medicine as a 
social process” (p. 13). 
The next paper (Goldenberg, 2005) analyzes EBP using three separate branches of 
philosophical thought, which included some Post-Positivist theory, Feminist Epistemology, and 
Phenomenology of Science and Medicine.  The section on Post-Positivism took the position that 
EBM and EBP are mired in Positivist thinking.  Next Goldenberg took Feminist Epistemology, 
connects with Post-Positivism, and analyzes EBM’s positivism from a feminist position, which 
concludes that empiricism does not yield neutral and universal facts. Then Goldenberg applied 
Phenomenology of Science and Medicine to the interpretation, stating that “further challenge 
notions of evidence in EBM by questioning why relevant evidence is assumed to come primarily 
from clinical trials and other ‘‘objective’’ measures.”  (p. 2628), and argued that the patients 
personal understanding and experience should be held as valid along with EBM.  The conclusion 
of Goldenberg’s paper is that EBM rests on the “unquestioning authority of scientific evidence, a 
position out of step with current post-positivistic thinking” (p. 2630) along with the thinking of 
the other theories mentioned.  It is worth noting that no mention was made of Popper in this 
paper, even though he and Critical Rationalism are categorically part of Post-Positivism, and his 





Gray and Mcdonald (2006) examines the limits of EBP, by considering the different 
aspects and antecedents to EPB, and posits that, “Our fundamental premise is that the ontological 
(and hence epistemological) assumptions underpinning evidence-based practice are too narrow 
and, as a consequence, are unable to engage with what is by now well-established bodies of 
social theory which have appreciably broadened our understanding of social phenomena” (p. 13).  
Gray and Mcdonald then moves on to what the authors term “the use of ethical reasoning” (p.15) 
as being the major activity of social work, and goes on to examine the importance of the client 
therapist relationship.  The article concludes with Gray and McDonald’s description of how EBP 
is both positivistic and political in nature, and argues that social work under EBP is too 
conceptually confined and theoretically impoverished. 
The next paper is by Greenhalgh and Russel (2009).  Their article is a critique of EBP 
based policymaking.  In the article, they examine the different paradigms within policy research, 
and then use these to examine the effects of EBP policy.  As with the previous articles, 
Greenhalgh and Russell hone in on EBP being positivistic in nature, before examining selected 
EPB based policies.  Their conclusion is that the EBP concepts of ‘getting evidence into practice’ 
is rather seductive in nature when it comes to policy making, “But they are fundamentally 
inaccurate, because policymaking is not about applying objective evidence to solve problems 
that are “out there” waiting for solutions.  It is about constructing these problems through 
negotiation and deliberation, and using judgements to “muddle through”—that is, to make 
context-sensitive choices in the face of persistent uncertainty and competing values” (p. 315). 
The final article looks at EBP and Person-in-Environment (PiE) (Simmons, 2012).  This 
author uses three different personal vignettes, to explore conflicts that exist between EBP and 




High-quality experimental evidence cannot, by definition, include fundamental attention 
to the many environmental forces that shape our clients’ experiences.  At the same time, 
ethical social work practice involves assessment and intervention that recognizes the 
impact of societal oppression due to factors of age, class, disability status, ethnicity, 
gender, nationality, race, religion, and sexual orientation and their relationship to the 
client’s experience of her or his problems.” (p. 8).   
Simmons (2012) concludes by stating that, “Models of EBP that exceedingly privilege 
experimental evidence may overlook the value of the PiE model of assessment and intervention.”  
(p. 13-14), that clients are inherently complex and that the context the client lives in is an 
important factor in treatment. 
Summary 
To summarize, EBP is the current and increasingly the only option for determining the 
course of treatment using available empirical evidence to guide the therapist.  Later on, it was 
expanded to include therapist experience, and finally client input.  While there are many 
proponents of EBP, and EBP has spread across the first world nations, there are numerous 
detractors of the theory as well.  These detractors label EBP as a positivistic theory attacking 
many of the basic underpinnings of EBP, both for its theory, and its implementation.  In the next 
chapter I will examine in more detail precisely why EPB is positivistic, but that our research 





Logical Positivism and Evidence Based Practice 
History of Evidence Based Practice and its Antecedents 
In this chapter, I will examine the major Philosophy of Science theories found in Logical 
Positivism relevant to my thesis, along with the precursors (Positivism and Empiricism) that 
Logical Positivism based itself on.  Before I begin, it is important to note that many people were 
involved in developing Logical Positivism and contributing to it; people such as, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap, A.J. Ayer, Herbert Feigl, Carl Hempel, Friedrich Waismann, 
Gustav Bergmann, Victor Kraft, Otto Neurath, and many others still, and they together produced 
large numbers of books, articles, editorials, and etcetera.  There are innumerable differences 
among all the contributors in this branch of Philosophy of Science that are far beyond the scope 
of this thesis, and would require a lengthy book to properly cover each author, and how their 
perspectives differed from the others.  Therefore, this chapter will cover the general concepts of 
the theories and will focus only on the concepts relevant to the topic mater of this thesis, rather 
than focusing on the specifics of an author or group of authors within Logical Positivism.  
Another point to address is that Logical Positivism is sometimes also referred to as, Logical 
Empiricism, and that the two terms are interchangeable. 
Both Positivism and Empiricism have precursors that go far back into history.  For 
example, the Greek philosopher Plato was writing about some of the concepts behind positivism 
back around 400 BCE, and the Indian philosopher, Kanada, was the first person known to write 
about some of the basic concepts behind Empiricism, sometime between 600-200 BCE.   
In the case of Empiricism, some of ideas would reemerge in the late Renaissance in Italy 




British Empiricism in the 17th century; the version that Logical Positivism based itself on.  Sir 
Francis Bacon and René Descartes were the early founders of British Empiricism, roughly in the 
same period as Sir Isaac Newton’s discoveries.  Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza followed 
later, and though neither directly contributed to scientific empiricism in their books, their ideas 
about politics and religion contributed to the ongoing development of scientific empiricism.  The 
key authors of British Empiricism were John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume, with 
Locke named as the founder of empiricism, and Hume being its key author.  British Empiricism 
then transformed into Phenomenalism after most of Hume’s followers rejected his conclusion 
that belief in an external world is rationally unjustifiable, and a few decades later the Logical 
Positivists rejected Phenomenalism, and based their movement on British Empiricism. 
Positivism on the other hand, got its start nearly two centuries later primarily due to the 
French philosopher Auguste Comte, who published from 1830 to 1842 the series The Course in 
Positive Philosophy, followed by A General View of Positivism in 1848.  Émile Durkheim was 
another important Positivist, though his interest was focused on Sociology.  Durkheim’s use of 
Positivism as a basis for social research was a key part of his efforts to legitimize Sociology as a 
Science.  However a few decades later Positivism was followed by Antipositivism that was led 
by the German sociologists Max Weber, and Georg Simmel, who rejected Positivism in its 
entirety and sought to have its concepts removed from Sociology.  Other scientists followed suit 
and accused Positivism of being scientism, and ideologues.  Meaning in that they were 
overemphasizing the importance of science, and that they were dogmatic and would not 
compromise there perspective in the slightest. 
Logical Positivism started in the mid 1800’s with Ludwig Wittgenstein being a key 




movement.  In Germany, Logical Positivism of the Vienna Circle grew in response to G.W.F. 
Hegel’s Metaphysics (a branch of philosophy that explores the fundamental nature of reality), 
forming the Berlin Circle.  Together in 1929 the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Circle hosted their 
first international meeting in Prague, and jointly released a pamphlet bringing together with some 
of the major proponents of the movement, and summarized the doctrines of the Vienna Circle 
(Stadler, 2001, p. 151-153).  Both circles dispersed in the mid to late 1930’s due the rise of 
Fascism combined with the joining of Germany with Austria, and followed by the start of World 
War II.  Just before this, Logical Positivism had spread to Britain, thanks to A. J. Ayer and his 
book Language, Truth and Logic, which was first published in 1933.  From England, Logical 
Positivism spread on to the rest of the world.  Work on Logical Positivism had largely ceased by 
the late 1930’s.  Several decades later, A.J. Ayer rejected his book Language Truth and Logic 
stating that, “Logical positivism died a long time ago.  I don’t think much of Language, Truth 
and Logic is true.  I think it is full of mistakes.  I think it was an important book in its time 
because it had a kind of cathartic effect. . . .  But when you get down to detail, I think it’s full of 
mistakes which I spent the last fifty years correcting or trying to correct.”  (Ayer, 1998, p. 49). 
Elements of Positivism & Logical Positivism 
 The key tenets behind Positivism are: 1) the logic of inquiry is identical across all the 
sciences; 2) The goal of science is to explain and predict; 3) Research must be empirically 
observable using the human senses of the researcher and inductive reasoning must be used to 
develop hypotheses that are to be tested during the research process;  4) Science and common 
sense are not the same at all and common sense should never be allowed to bias research or 
hypotheses;  5) Science must be judged only by logic, and must be free of any personal values 




that that all knowledge is sense experience, and the importance of evidence is based on sense 
experience (Hume, 1739, p. 6-10) The empiricists also argued that the inductive method is the 
key division between science and everything else, as only science makes use of the inductive 
method (Hume, 1739, p. 7, 319).  Furthermore, the empiricists argued that scientific 
investigation must follow a strictly defined methodology.  This methodology includes a cycle of 
deduction and induction, where sensory experience would be accumulated as evidence using the 
scientific method (as explained further below), and the inductive process or method (Magee, 
1973, p. 15,-17).  The inductive process would create a theory to explain the evidence; the theory 
would then be turned into a hypothesis via the deductive process, which would then be tested, 
which would generate new evidence, and the cycle then repeats, as the theory is refined.  The 
deductive process uses reasoning and logic to examine the theory for methods to test its veracity.  
Unfortunately, no philosopher past or present has ever managed to successfully come up with a 
rational explanation of how exactly the process of induction works, or the mechanics of how we 
go from evidence to theory, and it is referred to as the problem of induction. 
 The Logical Positivists took these concepts from the British Positivists, and the earlier 
Empiricists, and mostly added to them.  Some aspects though did change.  For example, as the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016) put it in their article on the Vienna Circle,  
Despite the pluralism of the Vienna Circle’s views, there did exist a minimal consensus 
which may be put as follows.  A theory of scientific knowledge was propagated which 
sought to renew empiricism by freeing it from the impossible task of justifying the claims 
of the formal sciences.  It will be noted that this updating did not leave empiricism 




What the Vienna Circle did change in the above, is they rejected Empiricism’s separation of the 
science of nature from the science of man, because they deemed the differences to be merely 
categorical and nothing else.  For the most part these were the types of changes made. 
Logical Positivism’s key concepts that concern this thesis are: 1) That a proposition only 
has meaning if it can be proved true or false by observation, and is known as the verifiability 
principle; 2) That there are only two sources of knowledge, logical reasoning (analytic a priori) 
and empirical experience (synthetic a posteriori), synthetic a priori or empirical reasoning is not 
considered possible.  Logical knowledge includes mathematics (due to the belief it is reducible to 
formal logic), and empirical knowledge includes physics, biology, psychology, and other 
sciences; 3) That Metaphysical statements are disallowed, as they cannot be verified empirically, 
and Metaphysics is viewed as meaningless.  This also means there no philosophical knowledge 
beyond logical knowledge and empirical knowledge –the purpose of philosophy is analyzing the 
meaning of statements and their logical interrelations; And 4) that all knowledge can and must be 
codified into a single standard language of science (which they tried and failed to develop) 
(Ayer, 1952; Murzi, 2007, p. 7-14; Stadler, 2001; Werkmeister, 1937, p. 357-376; Wittgenstein, 
1922, p. 31, 36, 83, 90). 
Contained within the different branches of Positivism are the ideas that scientific 
knowledge is cumulative in nature, that scientific theory can be proven true or false via empirical 
evidence, and that the more positive evidence you have, the stronger and more reliable the theory 
becomes (Magee, 1973, p. 14-17).  Scientific knowledge is increased by the gathering of 
evidence and by the discovery of laws of nature which would be defined as laws or rules that are 
found within nature (and also within human behavior and society) that are entirely invariable and 




are all potentially discoverable and eventually we will understand them in their entirety, via the 
continued gathering of evidence through experimentation, until they reach the point where the 
theory and associated law are considered fully researched and proven (Magee, 1973, p. 14).  At 
this point there remains no reason for further scientific investigation –the theory has reached the 
state of being a fully explained natural law.  Positivists also expressed the belief that scientific 
knowledge is built on the firm foundations of prior scientific discoveries, and that these 
discoveries represented the truth of the associated theories as expressed by the concept of laws of 
nature.  Discovering laws of nature is considered to be the primary focus of science.   
The scientific method, as originating from the Empiricists, is the process of gathering of 
meticulously measured observations from either experiments or nature/humanity.  As large 
numbers of these observations or facts were gathered and compiled, the belief was that general 
features or patterns would start to emerge, and that individual scientists could start to generate 
general hypothesizes about these patterns.  These hypotheses would then be developed into a 
theory using the process of induction, and the scientist would then attempt to confirm his theory 
by seeking evidence to prove the validity of the theory and establish a new law of nature.  If 
successful, this new law is then used by scientists to discover and exploit new secrets in nature, 
and expanding the realm of scientific knowledge by adding this new truth to our existing 
collection of truths and expanding the scope of the existing theory.  Scientists then move on to 
trying to find the next major law of nature.  For example, Newton’s theory of gravity became 
Newton’s Law of Gravitation.  It was considered at the time to be the first discovered law of 
nature, in that it that it passed all the tests applied to it for hundreds of years and was considered 
a proven theory or law.  It was believed that the Law of Gravitation could predict all outcomes 




all the celestial bodies, as well as the effects of gravity on earth.  So scientists moved on to new 
areas of research to discover new laws of nature, or to find additional ways the theory of gravity 
could be exploited. 
 Another important concept within Logical Positivism is the concept of probability, 
particularly their concept of logical probability, and the application of logical probability to the 
validity of a theory or hypothesis.  Put simply, the greater the quantity of corroborative evidence 
in support of the theory, the greater the probable validity of the theory logically.  As A.J, Ayer 
put it “Roughly speaking, all that we mean by saying that an observation increases the 
probability of a proposition is that it increases our confidence in the proposition, as measured by 
our willingness to rely on it in practice”(1936, p. 60).  So a theory that gets tested a 100 times 
and passes each test is considered logically more probably true, than a theory that has been 
positively tested twice.  It is important to note that this is a logical calculation, not mathematical, 
so there are no odds given.  Fundamentally, it is the assumption that the more a theory has been 
successfully tested, the more valid and therefore stronger it is. 
Connections between Positivism and EBP 
 So how does all of this relate to Evidence Based Practice?  As was mentioned in the prior 
chapter, this is not the first time the connection has been made between Evidence Based Practice 
and Logical Positivism, and I would argue that Logical Positivism and its associated ideas had a 
profound impact on the thought behind EBP.  As Bruce Thyer put it, 
Our common field of social work is no longer seen as supportable merely as a 
manifestation of individual or societal “caring” for those in need, but more in terms of the 
results, effects, or outcomes it produces among those it attempts to serve.  In some ways, 




Vienna Circle, in their assertion that the only scientifically meaningful questions were 
those susceptible to empirical verification or refutation.  (2008, p. 339). 
White & Willis’s based their paper on the positivist foundations of EBM, writing “(1) 
That EBM is based on an impoverished account of scientific knowledge; (2) that this is reflected 
in its behavourist and positivistic account of disease”, that “Virtually 90% of qualitative research 
is relegated to the dustbin of legitimate science because it is not positivistically executed and 
statistically based” (2002, p. 6).  Qualitative studies are not positivistically executed because the 
qualitative methodology is not considered objectively measurable due to the inability of the 
researcher to directly observe the effects; it is invalid because according to positivism, only the 
researcher’s experience can be considered objective; the client or patient’s experience has no 
value because it can’t be impassionedly observed by the researcher.  The Gold Standard of 
research, as the Social Work Policy Institute (2008) puts it, are randomized controlled trials.  
And, while they admit qualitative research has some value, it is best used to aid quantitative 
research, with qualitative being listed as having the lowest “strength” out of all the forms of 
research.  Fundamentally, this is just a slightly softened positivistic view, as qualitative research 
is just barely acceptable on its own.  It also connects with Logical Positivism’s two sources of 
knowledge, logical reasoning (analytic a priori) and empirical experience (synthetic a posteriori), 
in the two primary forms of evidence it considers acceptable.  Empirical experience is research 
results, and meta-analysis is logical reasoning.  They are the two strongest forms of evidence 
used by Evidence Based Practice. 
 As Dana Kovarsky put it, 
Drawing upon an epistemology of logical positivism, EBP is dominated by a discourse of 




the language found in official documents of professional organizations leaves little room 
for debate.  The authors describing EBP use modal verbs, for example, to convey their 
strong sense of certainty about the information being presented (2008, p.50) 
In this example, the author described how EBP makes use of the theories of Logical Positivism, 
including in their use of language to silence anything that they do not consider completely 
objective in research, along with voicing their own certainty in that objectivity, and in the 
material being discussed.  My own example of this would be the use of language around ‘gold 
standard’ treatments; the absolute certainty with which they are presented, and how rigorously 
they have been verified. 
One of the key ideas within EBP is that theories that have been tested the most are the 
ones we should be using in practice, as those are the theories that have withstood the most 
scrutiny and are thus more valid.  Cognitive Behavioral Practice is a prime example; as the 
Association for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies puts it “The most commonly used evidence-
based practice approaches for the treatment of psychological symptoms involve cognitive and 
behavior therapies (CBT).  The efficacy of CBT has been demonstrated for a wide-range of 
symptoms in adults, adolescents, and children.” (n.d., para. 6).  Arguably, CBT is the most 
common form of therapy available.  It has been extensively researched, there is a huge pile of 
supporting evidence for it, several meta-analyses have been performed, and its effectiveness is 
proven.  Behind all of that is a logical probability calculus from Logical Positivism.  This theory 
is best, because it is the most successfully predictive, in its extensive testing.  The whole 
emphasis of EBP is using theories that have been heavily tested, rigorously proven, and solidly 




Evidence Based Policy also has its connections to positivistic thinking.  Greenhalgh & 
Russell (2009) base their paper on this concept.  They wrote about how policy makers tend to 
support only practices with extensive evidence behind them,   
Evidence-based policymaking assumes that the ethical and moral issues faced by 
policymakers can be reduced to questions of “best evidence,” and that what is actually 
going on in the world can be equated with what the chosen metrics indicate is going on.  
It also assumes that empirical research, especially on “the impact of intervention X on 
outcome Y,” will provide the answer to most if not all policy questions; that if we do 
enough research, we will abolish situations in which the available evidence is irrelevant, 
ambiguous, uncertain, or conflicting; that evidence from research is value-free and 
context-neutral; and that such evidence is of greater value than evidence from personal 
experience or opinion.  (p. 307-308) 
As before, the focus is on the gathering of evidence to show “best practice”.  Another factor too, 
which is a latent assumption in positivism, is that research evidence is somehow objective, and 
thus free from personal values or judgements. This comes out of the assumption that objectivity 
is possible. 
 Now obviously Evidence Based Practice is based in Empiricism.  It uses Empiricism to 
justify itself.  Empiricism is part of Logical Empiricism, aka Logical Positivism.  They all 
believe in the accumulation of evidence.  The more evidence you have, the better that thing is.  
Evidence creates theory, evidence is used to validate that theory, and evidence is used to show 
how predictive and wonderful that theory is.  The fundamental basis of Evidence Based Practice 




practice over other practices that don’t have as much evidence themselves.  It is Logical 
Empiricism on a macro scale. 
 In the next chapter, I will introduce Karl Popper and look at his theories from Critical 
Rationalism that relate to the topic at hand.  We will look at Popper’s refutation of Logical 






Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalism 
The intent of this chapter is to delve into Popper’s theories in Philosophy of Science, 
which are collectively referred to as Critical Rationalism.  In this section, we will look briefly at 
the history behind Popper’s theories, and touch on his connections to the Vienna Circle. 
Following this, we will examine Popper’s concepts of evidence and their use in science: how 
evidence cannot prove theories; how we should seek to refute our theories to improve them; the 
need to construct our theories so that they can be refuted; his concept of corroborating a theory 
and the inability to use evidence to calculate the odds of the theory’s validity.  Following this, we 
will look at his criterion for demarcation, which defines what separates science from everything 
else, his concepts of truth, and man’s ability to recognize and achieve it.  Finally, we will 
examine his concepts of Objective Knowledge. 
Before I launch into Karl Popper’s theories on the Philosophy of Science, I wanted first 
to address an important misunderstanding that has propagated about Popper and his theories –the 
misunderstanding being that Popper was a Logical Positivist and that his theories are in fact 
positivistic.  Now there is a minute bit of truth to this, in that Popper started his career in 
Philosophy as a periphery member of the Vienna Circle, which was collectively one of the major 
contributors to the theories behind Logical Positivism (LP).  However, it is important to note that 
Popper was only very loosely attached to the Circle, and never attended any meetings.  He was 
also nicknamed the ‘official opposition’ by one of the inner circle members, and was largely the 
odd man out because of his opposition to the core tenants of Logical Positivism (Magee, 1973, p. 
5).  Poppers seminal work Logik der Forschung or The Logic of Scientific Discovery, the first 




still connected with the Vienna Circle.  But sadly because of the contents of his works, his 
Jewish ancestry, and because he was living in Austria during the rise of Nazism, he was unable 
to publish his books at the time, and fled Austria soon after.  It was not until 1959 that ‘The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery’ finally was first published in English.  Unfortunately, his theories 
have not spread very far beyond Europe and he is not particularly well known in North America, 
whereas in Europe he is a bit better known. 
Popper’s Philosophy of Science was the first major challenge to the theories of Logical 
Positivism.  A challenge that positivist philosophy was unable to effectively counter, so much so 
that many philosophers consider both positivism, and logical positivism to be philosophical dead 
ends.  For example John Passmore found that “Logical positivism, then, is dead, or as dead as a 
philosophical movement ever becomes.” (1967, p. 57).  Of course, there are still those who still 
support Logical Positivism, and take the stance that there is simply nothing more to talk about, or 
in other words, it isn’t philosophy any more, but fact that has ingrained itself within the scientific 
community. In a way I agree that this is the case, and in the next chapter I will address exactly 
why I think this represents a major problem.  The majority of information found in this chapter is 
from The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002), except where otherwise noted. 
Proof and Falsification 
Popper, unlike the logical positivists, argues that evidence can never be used to prove 
theories.  The only thing that evidence can be used for is to disprove a theory.  Popper’s method 
of demonstrating this concept is by using black and white swans. No number of observations of 
white swans, no matter how great the number of observations, can conclusively prove that all 
swans are white.  Yet a single observation of a black swan would falsify the theory that all swans 




refuse the conclusion, based on established concepts and definitions (this black bird is not a swan 
because it is black, all swans are white, for example), which creates the opportunity to 
methodologically reject any observation that may conflict with the theory. 
Popper therefor proposes, as an article of method, that we do not systematically avoid 
refutation, whether by adding ad hoc hypotheses, or ad hoc definitions, or by always refusing to 
accept the reliability of inconvenient experimental results, or by any other such device; and that 
we formulate our theories as unambiguously as we can, so as to expose them as clearly as 
possible to refutation. (Magee, 1973, p. 19) 
In addition to the above, Popper also speaks of our not letting go of our theories too 
quickly either, as it is also important to remain critical of the tests and presumed evidence, while 
we attempt to make an honest attempt to poke holes in our theory. 
Applying these concepts, Magee (1973, p. 19-20) offers the example of the theory that 
water boils at a 100° centigrade.  Our first duty is to seek out examples of where the theory fails, 
in the hopes of improving the theory if and when it does, or creating a brand new theory that is 
more accurate.  Now in the case of this theory there are cases where water will not boil at 100° 
C, such as when the water is placed in a closed vessel.  Therefore, the theory we had developed 
which we thought was a natural law is disproven, and either needs to be improved to account for 
this discrepancy, or abandoned in favor of a theory with greater explanatory power.  In this case 
we choose to rewrite the theory so that it now includes the condition that the water not be in a 
closed vessel, and again look to refute this. This then leads us to find out that changes in altitude 
again disprove the theory, so the theory gets rewritten again to add another condition, so that the 
theory now reads, water boils at 100° C, when not contained in a closed vessel, and when at sea 




adapted to accommodate all the discrepancies, and a new theory must be developed.  A real 
world example of this process is Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation (the law of Gravity), 
which was believed to be a natural law for over two hundred years, until Einstein’s theory of 
Relativity eventually overthrew it, due to the increasing number of problems that Newton’s 
theory could not account for, that Einstein’s theory did (and much more beyond that). Einstein 
also firmly believed that his theory is flawed as well, and spent decades trying to perfect it.  So in 
all likelihood, his theory will be eventually overthrown as well. 
Corroboration 
While Popper did state that evidence maybe be used to corroborate a theory (basically, 
the theory has been vigorously tested, and not have failed as of yet), his argument is that 
evidence cannot be used for any kind of proof or probability calculation towards a theory’s 
veracity, no matter how much evidence is gathered that is in support of the particular theory.  In 
other words, because theories cannot be conclusively proven with evidence, it is not possible to 
evaluate or calculate its veracity or probability of being correct, no matter how much evidence in 
the theory’s favor is gathered.  While the evidence may corroborate (fail to disprove the theory), 
it adds no weight at all to the theory’s validity.   
Criterion of Demarcation 
This leads us to Popper’s criterion for demarcation between science, and everything else.  
For a theory to be scientific, it must be testable in its entirety and it must be falsifiable, or in 
other words, that the theory must contain clear conditions where the theory will fail.  There can 
be no ambiguity in the theory’s statement.  Theories also do not need to be complex in nature, 
quite the opposite, the simpler the theory’s formulation the more readily testable it is.  For 




statement at all, as obviously it will rain someplace, at some time eventually.  This theory is not 
quantifiable, and thus not scientific, and is useless.  As Popper points out, any idiot can come up 
with an unlimited number of such statements that have the near certainty of being true.  The 
statement that, ‘it will rain in New York City at noon tomorrow’, however, has specific 
limitations, and can be falsified.  This is starting to have some potential due to its informational 
content, but again, any fool can create an endless number of such statements, if they are not 
concerned about the end results.  What is desired are statements, with a lot of information, and 
low probability that come close to the truth in their predictions.  This is the basis of useful 
scientific theory according to Popper.  If these statements can be tested, they can be falsified. 
The other key thing that this criterion of demarcation achieves, is that it shifts the focus in 
science from actively attempting to prove theories (which is an impossibility, as all theories have 
the possibility to be falsified at a later point), to actively trying to disprove theories.  This 
liberates the scientist, as the failure of a theory becomes a good thing, instead of a bad thing, 
because it helps us move forward towards a better understanding of the phenomena attached to 
the theory.  As Magee states, “according to Popper, falsification in whole or in part, is the 
anticipated fate of all hypotheses, and that we should even rejoice in the falsification of an 
hypothesis that we have cherished as our brain child” (Magee, 1973, p. 36), because these lead us 
to new possibilities.  In other words, disproving your theory is a good thing, not a failure. 
Scientific Advancement 
Popper argued that the process of scientific advancement is not based in the accumulation 
of knowledge.  While successive theories can contain aspects of the prior theories, it is the 
theories that break away from past understanding while offering greater explanatory power than 




radically changing our understanding.  Above all, Popper stressed the concept that it is the failure 
of our theories that drive scientific knowledge forward, not the supposed successes.  As 
demonstrated before, failure is what drives the need to improve or replace the fallen theory, for 
until a theory fails, we do not know what is wrong with our existing theories.  Popper suggests 
that theorists should be bold with their theorizing, as boldness offers the greatest opportunities 
for the advancement of scientific knowledge, assuming the theory can stand up to rigorous 
attempts to test (disprove) said theory. 
Knowledge is Theoretic 
Another key aspect of Popper’s theories is that human knowledge is entirely theoretically 
based.  As Popper puts it, 
Science does not rest upon solid bedrock.  The bold structure of its theories rises, as it 
were, above a swamp.  It is like a building erected on piles.  The piles are driven down 
from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop 
driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground.  We simply stop 
when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the 
time being (2002, p. 94). 
The fundamental meaning behind this is humanity’s utter inability to know the absolute 
truth about anything.  While science helps better our understanding of things, this understanding 
lacks solid foundations, as it is impossible for us to know the truth, as we have no way of 
knowing if and when we have arrived at the truth; there is no possible way of gauging where it is 
or how far away we are from it, or if we went right past it.  Our understanding is mostly of a 
predictive nature; our theories are useful to us, as they help us make predictions about outcomes 




This is why Popper refers to them as piles, as piles are not always entirely stable, unlike natural 
laws and bedrock. 
Objective Knowledge 
The final major theory from Popper that we will examine is his concepts of Objective 
Knowledge, which was first introduced as a paper in the book Physics, Logic, and History: based 
on the First International Colloquium held at the University of Denver, May 16-20, 1966 (1970).  
The formula he uses to explain objective knowledge is P1 → TS → EE → P2.  P1 represents the 
initial problem, TS is the trial solution proposed to solve the initial problem, EE is the process of 
error elimination applied to the trial solution, and P2 is the resulting situation once the solution is 
applied, with any new problems. 
It is essentially a feedback process.  It is not cyclic, for P2 is always different from P1; 
even complete failure to solve a problem teaches us something new about where it’s 
difficulties lie, and what the minimum conditions are which any solution for it must meet 
–and therefor alters the problem situation (Magee, 1973, p. 66). 
This also ties into Poppers assertion that one needs to be bold in one’s imagination, and 
in one’s theorizing, if one wants have the possibility of causing a dramatic change in the 
problem.  Virtually all major new theories that caused major changes in our theoretical 
conceptualization were incredibly bold in their assertions –so much so that it often took decades 
before these theories were eventually accepted by the greater community; theories like Freud’s 
Psychodynamic theory, Copernicus’s Heliocentric theory, Newton’s theory of Gravity, Einstein’s 
theory of Relativity, to name a few.  All such theories radically changed human understanding, 
and were incredibly bold in their assertions. Moreover, while many of these theories were 




theories that supplanted them were also bold in their assertions as well.  Even bold theories that 
fail rigorous scrutiny are still valuable, because while they did not succeed, they can often point 
us in new directions, or identify theoretical dead ends, which also can point us in new directions. 
The next chapter will examine how Popper’s theories overturn most of the relevant 
theories in Logical Positivism, and will examine how Popper’s theories impact Evidence Based 
Practice, and also how science is presently being conducted in general, and in particular to the 
field of clinical social work, and how it ties in to Logical Positivism.  Finally, I will look into the 
implications of all of these things combined, on the application of Evidence Based Practice, its 
implications for clinical practice, and offer some thoughts about applying Popper’s Critical 







The purpose of this thesis is to examine Evidence Based Practice by looking at its 
theoretic foundations in Philosophy of Science, to connect it to Logical Positivism, and then 
analyzing Evidence Based Practice using Critical Rationalism, the branch in Philosophy of 
science that falsified Logical Positivism, with the expectation that Critical Rationalism will 
expose problems with the concepts and application of EBP.  In the prior chapters I have 
introduced and examined Evidence Based Practice.  I have introduced the concepts behind 
Logical Positivism and its extensive history including the antecedents of Positivism and 
Empiricism that Logical Positivism based itself upon.  I have made the connection between 
Logical Positivism and Evidence Based Practice.  And finally, I have gone through the history 
and the relevant theories from Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalism. 
In this chapter, I will give a brief overview of the theories, I will examine the specific 
ways that Critical Rationalism falsified Logical Positivism, and how those same theories affect 
Evidence Based Practice, I will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this thesis, I will then 
consider the implications involved, and finally I will offer my conclusion. 
Evidence Based Practice, Logical Positivism, and Critical Rationalism 
The definition for Evidence Based Practice is “the integration of the best research 
evidence with clinical expertise and patient values” (Sackett et al., 2000). We need to use the 
best available research evidence with our experience while considering our client’s values when 
determining treatment.  In chapter three, I posited the connection between EBP and Logical 
Positivism.  That both LP and EBP tend to reject anything that is not empirically derived or not 




empirical experience are deemed valid.  Extensively tested theories are considered more valid 
than theories that have only been tested a few times, and those extensively tested theories are 
probably true because they have been rigorously proven with a solid empirical foundation, and 
that all of this is a logical probability calculus (a calculus in Philosophy is a logical calculation), 
which comes from Logical Positivism.  This is also the same with EBP based policy, in that its 
decisions on policy are also based on the accumulation of evidence.  I also wrote about EBP’s 
obvious connections to Empiricism (which itself is also part of Logical Positivism), as 
Empiricism is EBP’s justification for us to use EBP.  Empiricists (and by extension the Logical 
Positivists) believe in the accumulation of evidence –the more supporting evidence you have, the 
stronger the theory is.  Evidence spawns theory, evidence validates theory, and evidence shows 
how predictive the theory is. EBP fundamentally accumulates evidence and uses it to base choice 
in a theory, and justify its use over other theories. 
Popper’s Critical Rationalism argues against these concepts.  He rejects logical 
probability, arguing that it is impossible to logically calculate any sort of probability of a theory 
being valid, no matter how many times it has been tested, as the theory can fail testing at any 
point in the future –because of new tools of measurement, or in testing a new area the theory 
should predict, or problems with the internal validity of the prior tests, and etcetera.  Popper’s 
(year) criterion for demarcation separates science from everything by requiring that all theories 
must be clearly and fully testable and therefore falsifiable; there must exist ways to completely 
disprove the theory. Popper also shifts the focus away from attempting to prove theories, to 
attempting to disprove them as the major focus of science.  Popper also argued against the 
concept of accumulating knowledge, instead focusing on trying to break away from past 




theory that advances science not the supposed success.  The failures give us the opportunity to 
create better theories.  Our knowledge is entirely theoretical; it rests on pillars driven into the 
swamp of the unknown.  Poppers concept of objective knowledge is a feedback process, P1 → 
TS → EE → P2.  P1 represents the initial problem, TS is the trial solution proposed to solve the 
initial problem, EE is the process of error elimination applied to the trial solution, and P2 is the 
resulting situation once the solution is applied, with any new problems. 
Analysis & Synthesis 
Evidence Based Practice’s major focus is obviously evidence.  The more a theory or 
therapy is tested, the better it is.  Yet there is not really a way of demonstrating that it is, because 
successful testing is just proof that it has not failed… yet.  Logically you cannot predict its 
ultimate success because we cannot see into the future.  Furthermore, an untested theory cannot 
be assigned probability either.  It may be just as successful as the current favorite, it might 
exceed it, or it might fail immediately.  The heavily tested theory is in the same situation as the 
untested theory in that it has the potential to succeed or fail too, we do not know.  We just have 
some confidence in the theory.  Furthermore, an untested theory has unlimited potential, meaning 
that we do not know what its potential is, because we have not tested it all, and it has not failed 
yet, it may contain the ultimate truth, not that we could ever be sure, however.  This is why 
Popper used the example of the pillars driven into a swamp, as you never know when something 
you thought was solid might suddenly sink into the mud.  Therefore, while it is tempting to 
believe in our evidence, we can never be sure of it. 
There are concerns with the research used as evidence too.  Arguably, the emphasis in 
research is to prove theories, not disprove them.  In general, funding is often dependent on 




This again stems from the belief that theories can in some way be proven, and that good results 
are positive results. This belief is also held within the public at large, among whom are people 
that drive policy.  Critical rationalism does not agree at all with this perspective, and argues we 
should be trying hard to falsify our theories, so that we can then work on finding new stronger 
theories, or fixing the existing ones.  In history, most major advancements in science happen 
when the old theory fails.  Eventually a new more powerful theory arises from the ashes as 
Einstein’s Theory of Relativity overthrew Newton’s Law of Gravitation.  This is why Popper 
argues that we should be bold in our theorizing, to create the greatest possibilities for scientific 
advancement if that theory can withstand attempts to falsify it.  Falsification, barring errors in 
testing, is the closest thing we can have to certainty, as all theories have the potential to be 
falsified down the road. 
Another concern is the potential for a chilling effect in the creation of new forms of 
therapy.  People working in therapy generated many of the therapeutic models we use today.  
Sigmund Freud developed psychoanalysis, Carl Rogers developed person-centered therapy, 
Albert Elis developed rational emotional behavioral therapy, Aaron Beck developed cognitive 
therapy, Marsha Linehan developed dialectical behavioral therapy, and so on.  Many of these 
therapies were developed as part of that person’s approach with clients.  These personal 
approaches are then later developed into a theory, tested, and some are eventually manualized.  
With the advent of EBP the focus has shifted to using existing manualized approaches, in 
particular cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), as it has the greatest body of research behind it.  I 
remember in one of my placements being told, partially as a joke, that I could use any form of 
therapy I liked, as long as it was CBT. The reason for this was that CBT was the only accepted 




primarily (or only) manualized treatments, where are the revolutionary new therapies going to 
come from? How will therapists develop their own methods, and boldly theorize on them, if they 
are being pushed into using only the EBP approved therapies. 
EBP also has the potential to cause harm when combined with policymaking.  EBP can 
be used as a justification for only permitting certain preferential treatments, particularly if that 
treatment is well researched with a multitude of positive results.  Even better if that therapy does 
not cost as much, it could mean all kinds of savings for the insurers.  EBP’s main emphasis is on 
the use of evidence-backed treatments, meaning treatments with generally overwhelming results.  
Anything else is arguably frowned on by EBP.  What is even more concerning is when you have 
policy makers who may know little about EBP, EBP’s foundations, or the treatments being 
pushed forward by the different groups associated with EBP, such as when government 
politicians or policy makers from insurance companies get involved.  So not only do we have the 
problem of the use of evidence in a way that cannot be entirely supported logically (evidence 
cannot prove things), but on top of it you have people who may know little about the issues, 
issuing policy. 
Popper was one of the first in modern Philosophy who successfully challenged the 
concepts of objective knowledge, which comes from the Empiricists, in part with his formula P1 
→ TS → EE → P2, and with a multitude of logical arguments such as,  
We may know or understand a man's system of dispositions pretty well; that is to say, we 
may be able to predict how he would act in a number of different situations.  But since 
there are infinitely many possible situations, of infinite variety, a full understanding of a 
man's dispositions does not seem to be possible.  Theories are similar: a full 




these are infinite in a non-trivial sense: there are infinitely many situations of infinite 
variety to which the theory might be applicable; that is to say, upon which some of its 
logical consequences may bear; and many of these situations have never been thought of; 
their possibility may not yet have been discovered.  But this means that nobody, neither 
its creator nor anybody who has tried to grasp it, can have a full understanding of all the 
possibilities inherent in a theory; which shows again that the theory, in its logical sense, 
is something objective and something objectively existing - an object that we can study, 
something that we try to grasp (1966, p. 15). 
Put simply, it is impossible for us to objectively test a theory, because we cannot possibly 
grasp all the possibilities as we cannot understand the entirety of the theory, and thus cannot 
formulate all possible tests.  It is in part because of this, that theories can eventually fail hundreds 
of years later; because we cannot not know, what tests would break the theory.  Furthermore, this 
is also an important reason why Popper told us that our theories are always on shaky ground, as 
you never know when they will fail you. 
Adding to this, we have the massive problem of investigating the human mind itself, 
because we do not yet have the tools that let us directly investigate it.  Sure, we have functional 
magnetic resonance imaging, and we have electroencephalograms, and all kinds of cutting-edge 
technology that are helping us study the brain. But we know virtually nothing about the mind, 
not how it works, not where it is, or even if it is found in the body or not.  There is a veritable 
mountain of theories about this, but no supporting evidence for any of them.  My former mentor 
spent his career studying the mind.  He liked to say, half joking, that the mind was attached to the 
body on some other plane or dimension as a bluish ball that attached to us kind of like a tail, and 




how the brain works, tells us the mind cannot reside there, as the brain is as far as we know, is 
nothing but an organic computational machine that processes conditional statements (if x number 
of signals are received then send signal y, otherwise wait).  Put simply we have no way of 
directly studying the mind, and we are not yet at the point where we can directly interpret the 
brain’s computations.  This is a huge problem because it means we do not have much primary 
source evidence yet, because what we have evidence of is synaptic activity that we think 
correlates with reports from the subject, and we have patterns of activity that correlate with 
stimulus.  We do not have capability to observe directly.  This also means we don’t really have 
primary evidence when it comes to researching mental illness, because at best we have evidence 
of differences in brain structure or differences in patterns of brain functioning, and at worst we 
are relying on behavior and responses from research subjects, which can easily be misattributed; 
our foundational pillars are tenuous.  This does not mean that social work practice does not have 
a scientific foundation, but we do need to keep in mind the tenuousness of the evidence we use in 
our therapeutic decisions. 
Popper’s criterion of demarcation (what separates science from everything else) requires 
that all scientific theories have to have ways of being clearly and completely refutable, for 
everything contained within the theory.  You have to be able to refute the entire theory with 
sufficient appropriate evidence, and the theory cannot contain any elements that allow it to 
obfuscate itself, or that do not enable falsification.  The question is –do our theories meet that 
criterion? 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
As I said in chapter 2, this entire thesis is theoretical, but then so is human knowledge.  




Ayer’s version of Logical Positivism (Ayer, 1952) is very well known within North America, 
and still believed in to this day, even despite the author’s later total rejection of his own book. 
Karl Popper and his theories are virtually unknown in North America, and he has only recently 
been catching on in Europe, decades after his book The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934) was 
published.  Popper’s theories are probably not perfect either, and he knew there are likely 
problems.  But, I think there are some really good ideas in Popper’s theories, even if I am a bit 
biased.  Another consideration is that it is incredibly difficult to pin down exactly what Logical 
Positivism is, even for many of its antecedents.  Many people theorized about it, there were 
countless disagreements between the proponents, and as a result there are many ways of looking 
at the whole concept. My rendition of it in this thesis is a very coarse overview, due to the 
extreme degree of material published. 
Implications 
As with most human endeavors, there is often good mixed with bad.  At its heart, EBP is 
not a bad idea; but I think the emphasis is skewed too far towards the evidence part, and too far 
away from the others, which I argue are equally important.  From my own experience as an 
intern, I had a substantial number of clients that came to me not wanting CBT.  The reason was 
that every time they went seeking therapy, they got CBT; it did not work for them even after 
several treatment programs with it, and they had had enough.  On top of all that, they were 
having difficulty finding a therapist who would not just give them CBT again, because of their 
health care coverage.  
I, however, am not knocking CBT.  It is a very good treatment approach, which works for 
many people.  However, CBT does not work for everyone –depending on which meta-analysis 




populations.  Using available research is a great idea, and I cannot think of a therapist that would 
object to using the available research (when time permits), but therapists also have to be able to 
throw out the research when it is not working for their client, or when their client wants 
something else.   
Above all, I feel that EBP should not be pushed as policy, as these sorts of policies have 
an innate tendency to push specific treatments, even to the exclusion of all else.  This approach 
throws out everything else in EBP about therapist experience, and client beliefs.  Worse, EBP 
has the potential to be detrimental to the development of new forms of therapy, by not allowing 
therapists to develop their own methods while working with clients. Given the history of 
psychotherapy, it is highly likely we are making huge mistakes right now, either the way we 
think about theory and/or therapy is all wrong, or we find out treatment x we thought was great 
was really doing long term harm. It is pure hubris to somehow think we got it right finally.  Yet 
still, only the extensively empirically tested treatments are pushed, and they are extensively 
proven into the ground with endless research, while quietly ignoring the rest, the non-empirical 
studies, and the theories/treatments that do not have the funding to be tested.  We might be 
missing the next big revolution in our understanding, with our obsession to prove everything. 
Conclusion 
This thesis was the examination of the theory of Evidence Based Practice (EBP), using 
Logical Positivism (LP), and Critical Rationalism (CR).  My argument is that EBP’s foundations 
are based on LP and its antecedents Positivism, and Empiricism.  I chose CR because of its 
extensive refutation of LP, which in turn points out problems with EBP.  In this, I covered EBP, 




connected it to EBP’s theoretic standpoint and its pedagogy. Next, I delved into Popper’s CR and 
its relevant theories. 
My key arguments are that this extreme focus on positive results (proof) is deeply flawed.   
Compounded positive evidence is not particularly useful because it offers no predictive power.  
Logical probability is a fallacy because that theory could fall apart at its very next test, or any 
test after that.  Popper argues stringently that our aim in science should be putting all our efforts 
into trying to refute our theory, not prove it, as refuting the theory creates the opportunity for a 
new stronger theory to replace it, or for the existing theory to be further improved.   Another key 
CR argument is about objective knowledge, which Popper argues is impossible, as there is no 
way for us to entirely comprehend the entirety of a theory and all of its possible implications, and 
thus be objective in our approach to it. 
I think we social workers should be careful with our use of EBP.  While research can be a 
great aid to treatment, we need to balance that with the other two perspectives of the therapist’s 
experience, and the client’s rights.  EBP should not be used in policy as a basis for enforcing 
specific treatments, as we risk causing a chilling effect on new avenues of therapy, if therapists 
are being pushed into using manualized treatments, over their own developing treatment 
concepts; not to mention trampling over therapist experience and client rights. 
I think the most important concept to take away from this is that positive proof is largely 
irrelevant and a logical impossibility.  The only thing one can hope for is to disprove a theory, 
and thus create the possibility for the advancement of science, and our fallible understanding.  As 
the Nobel Laureate and neurophysiologist, Sir John Eccles put it “according to Popper, 
falsification in whole or in part is the anticipated fate of all hypotheses, and we should even 




thereby relieved from fears and remorse, and science becomes an exhilarating adventure where 
imagination and vision lead to conceptual developments transcending in generality and range the 
experimental evidence” (1970, p. 107).  Second, for us to remember Popper’s description of the 
foundations of science and how unstable those foundations are, even perilously so, driven into 
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